71. Animal Ethics: Moral Vegetarianism, Part 4 of 13
Suffering is more than pain. Deprivation of liberty, for example, is a kind of suffering that need not be painful in any straightforward sense. Think of the suffering involved in solitary confinement. Functionally, we might attempt to
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72. Animal Ethics: Moral Vegetarianism, Part 9 of 13
have a right not to have pain inflicted on them. Consequently, the killing of some animals for food, if done painlessly, is not morally objectionable. KBJ: Martin forgot about the human beings who lack a right to life, including infants.
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73. Animal Ethics: Philip E. Devine on Vegetarianism
in their development to feel pain. Nor could he object to meat-eating if the slaughter were completely painless and the raising of animals at least as comfortable as life in the wild. Nor could he object to the painless killing of wild animals.
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74. Animal Ethics: From Today's New York Times
in one area may cause pain elsewhere. My mind and spirit are continually tested by outrages, from the countless dead innocents in current wars to the limited life prospects of my son’s first-grade classmates with drug dealers for
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75. Animal Ethics: R. G. Frey on the Principle of the Equal Consideration of Int...
from the capacity to feel pain, which he labels a 'prerequisite' for having interests at all; and animals can and do suffer, can and do feel pain. The principle of the equal consideration of interests, therefore, applies to them, which in turn
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76. Animal Ethics: John Passmore (1914-2004) on Bentham's Treatment of Animals
be accounted equal. If all pain is evil, as Bentham thought, then the pain of animals—assuming only that they can feel pain—ought not to be ignored in man's moral decisions. The pains of animals might be less, as not including the
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77. Animal Ethics: Are You Wearing Man's Best Friend? That Trim on the Hood of ...
about on the ground in pain. At this point, the worker may pick up a block of wood or a pipe and hit the dog over the head a few times. Again, documentary video reveals that this typically does not kill the dogs. The point is to injure the
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78. Animal Ethics: Julian H. Franklin on the Use of Animals in Research
To inflict death or pain on animals for scientific or medical research is wrong morally, and ought to be prohibited. This follows from everything said in the text about the rights of animals. This does not mean that animals may never be
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79. Animal Ethics: W. D. Ross (1877-1971) on Animal Rights
It is because we think their pain a bad thing that we think we should not gratuitously cause it. And I suppose that to say we have a duty to so-and-so is the same thing as to say that we have a duty, grounded on facts relating to them, to behave in
http://animalethics.blogspot.com/2007/07/w-d-ross-1877-1971-on-animal-rights.html - 91.6kb
80. Animal Ethics: From Today's New York Times
I cannot imagine the pain inflicted on this poor bull.I hope that we as a species will realize someday that treating animals as not feeling pain has its repercussions.In a very macho culture, this practice is surely the height of
http://animalethics.blogspot.com/2006/09/from-todays-new-york-times_14.html - 85.3kb
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